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Abstract  
An increase in train traffic is a politically welcomed trend, which on the other hand has led to too high capacity utilisation at 
times and a railway network sensitive to disturbances. Delays are easily spread, causing high cost. A mean of controlling the 
secondary delays is to use efficient operational prioritisation rules for trains in conflict. This paper presents an evaluation of 
the current Swedish prioritisation rule. For two frequent conflict situations the associated cost related to applying the rule is 
calculated. The result indicates a poor economic efficiency and show that significant savings can be achieved by changing 
strategy.  
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1. Introduction 
An increase in train traffic is in Sweden a politically welcomed trend. This has on the other hand led to too 
high capacity utilisation at times and a railway network sensitive to disturbances. For some areas, at periods of 
the day, the overutilisation often results in delays. In Sweden, trains with very heterogeneous traffic are operating 
on the same tracks. Disturbances often occur due to various reasons, which can be analysed and prevented 
separately, but in this paper we focus on secondary (i.e. consecutive, or knock-on) delays. Secondary delays are 
the induced effect to other traffic when a delayed train disturbs other trains. Because of the many trains and the 
traffic heterogeneity, delayed trains will easily disturb other traffic and the delays are easily spread (Andersson, 
Peterson and Törnquist Krasemann, 2011).  
  Train delays result in high time costs for passengers, freight owners, operators and infrastructure providers, 
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and the induced socio-economic costs are substantial. If the secondary delays could be reduced, an extensive part 
of the costs could be reduced and welfare increase. A mean of reducing the secondary delays can be found in the 
operational train dispatching where dispatchers give priority to a certain train when there is a conflict between 
two trains. We have a European perspective where a master timetable is used and trains are scheduled in seconds. 
The current main operational prioritisation rule in Sweden dictates that the dispatchers should prioritise trains on 
time (i.e. trains that depart and run according to their timetable) if they are in conflict with delayed trains not 
running according to their timetable (Trafikverket, 2013).  
This paper presents an evaluation of the current prioritisation rule. In two real world examples the paper 
illustrates some concrete conflict situations and the associated delay cost related to applying the rule. The aim is 
to show that cost reductions can be made with another strategy. The intention of this paper is to increase the 
awareness of the prioritisation problem and it could be used as an incitement for further more comprehensive and 
detailed studies of how to construct new rules. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the problem with operational prioritisation of trains in 
conflict and present the Swedish rule. Section 3 describes two conflict situation examples. In section 4 the main 
parameters used when calculating the cost for travel time and delays are described. Also the Swedish parameter 
values are presented together with the formula and other parameter values needed for the delay cost calculation. 
The cost is then calculated for the two examples. In Section 5 conclusions and future research are discussed.  
2. Operational prioritisation of trains in conflict 
In previous research several ideas for railway traffic disturbance management and prioritisation of trains in 
conflict have been studied. Jespersen-Groth et al. (2009) have studied three main sub problems in railway 
disruption management; timetable adjustment, rolling stock and crew re-scheduling. In all these areas delays 
affect the original plan and a new one has to be constructed in real-time. For small disturbances, small 
modifications of the timetable are enough, but for larger disruptions overtakings, changes in stopping pattern 
and/or cancellation of trains could be necessary. However, according to the authors, it is hard to estimate how 
severe the disruptions are, i.e. if a disturbance should be classified as a small or a large disturbance. 
Kliewer and Suhl (2011) have evaluated various railway dispatching strategies. Instead of focusing on the 
timeliness of the trains they focus on the passengers’ waiting time due to the different dispatching strategies. For 
example, if the dispatching strategy is to never let a connecting train wait for another train that is delayed, the 
passenger may get long waiting times which result in high costs.  
Törnquist (2007) has used a heuristic approach to minimise e.g. the total delay, delay costs and travel times in 
case of disturbances. Depending on which objective is used, the dispatchers’ decisions in conflict situations 
differ. The choice of strategy also depends on how long in the future the operational planning horizon reaches. 
One conclusion of the study is that the conflict resolution strategy should be able to change and not result in the 
same type of trains being punished or prioritised over and over again. 
Corman et al. (2012) has also used heuristic algorithms to solve a bi-objective conflict resolution goal to 
minimise the train delays and the passenger dissatisfaction. These two objectives are sometimes in conflict since 
the minimisation of train delays could result in cancellation of trains, among other things, which is a large 
dissatisfaction for the passengers.    
From previous research we can learn that the best prioritisation rule depends on which perspective is being 
used and it can differ depending on situations. The current rule in Sweden is instead strict and trains should be 
handled in the same way in all conflict situation, as will be describes further on. 
2.1. The Swedish prioritisation rule and its implementation 
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In Sweden the main measure of train performance is punctuality; the number of trains arriving to their final 
destination within 3/5/15 minutes of their planned arrival time (3 minutes for airport shuttle trains, 5 minutes for 
regional trains and 15 minutes for long-distance trains). Also the en-route performance is measured and a train is 
defined late if it is more than 3 minutes late according to its timetable. Then the cause of the disturbance must be 
reported to Trafikverket. When delays of more than 5 minutes occur the operator that causes the delay is then 
being charged by Trafikverket. Trafikverket also has to pay the involved operators if they cause the delay 
(Trafikverket, 2013). This gives a large incentive for both Trafikverket and the operators to decrease the amount 
and magnitude of train delays.  
The Swedish current main dispatching rule for conflict resolution in train traffic dictates that the dispatcher 
should prioritise trains on time if they are in conflict with delayed trains (Trafikverket, 2013). The intention of 
this rule is to prevent delays from spreading. The dispatcher could deviate from the rule if there is a written 
request from an operator to prioritise between the operator’s own trains. A written request can also be made in an 
agreement between operators that some important trains from one operator should have higher priority than trains 
from another operator. This request must very clearly specify which trains that should be given higher priority 
and which trains that should be given a lower priority and it must be sent in together with the initial path request. 
In a conflict involving several delayed trains it is up to the dispatcher to make the best overall decisions.  
In practice the train dispatchers deviate from the rule more frequently when they see a better overall solution 
by giving priority to a delayed train, as can be seen in the following examples. However, their decisions are then 
much based on previous experience and, to be strict, they are actually deviating from the rule. This leads to 
variations in the outcome depending on which dispatcher is making the decisions and how the dispatcher gives 
priority in this particular situation. 
All train slots in Swedish railway timetables contain some amount of margin time (i.e. buffer time or time 
supplements) which the trains can use when they get disturbed. The intention with margins is to construct a more 
robust timetable in which trains can recover from small delays and keep the delays from spreading to other trains. 
However, to get the desired effect of the margins, it is essential that they are properly used by the train 
dispatchers. Andersson, Peterson and Törnquist Krasemann (2013) have analysed railway timetable robustness 
and found conflict situations where there is a special need for flexible margin use. The current prioritisation rule 
does not always allow for the needed flexibility and it is hard for the train dispatchers to overlook the impacts of 
the different decisions. A new way to prioritise between trains in conflict is a necessary condition when 
increasing timetable robustness according to the authors. 
In Fig. 1 we can see a typical conflict situation at station B where train 2 is scheduled to enter the line close 
after train 1, which is delayed. 
The graphs in the figure illustrate two distinct dispatching possibilities; either train 1 runs after train 2 and 
becomes more delayed (left graph), or train 1 runs ahead of train 2, which means that train 2 will get a small 
delay (right graph). In this example train 2 can recover from the delay before reaching its final destination 
(station E) thanks to its margins.  
According to the current prioritisation rule the first solution is the correct one and we can see in the figure that 
this decision has a large impact for the punctuality for train 1.  
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Fig. 1. Two different scenarios in a typical conflict situation when the delayed train 1 runs either before or after the initially punctual train 2. 
The continuous lines are the planned timetable and the dashed lines represent the outcome with delays. In the scenario to the right, train 2 
runs according to its schedule, i.e. the dashed and solid grey lines coincide. 
3. Real world examples of a conflict situation 
In this section a typical conflict situation is described by two examples. The examples are from the Swedish 
Southern mainline, a double-track line between Stockholm and Malmö. This is one of the most congested railway 
lines in Sweden where long-distance trains share the tracks with regional, commuter and freight trains. Delayed 
trains end up behind other slower trains and can not recover from their initial delay which makes the traffic on 
this line very sensitive to disturbances. The two examples illustrate a conflict situation, commonly appearing in 
the Swedish railway traffic. At this line, every long-distance train is exposed to 3-5 similar conflict situations per 
journey, when being only a few minutes delayed. Since there are 13 long-distance trains operating on the line per 
direction and day, the number of possible conflicts is rapidly increasing when considering all lines and train 
types. 
For the two trains involved in each conflict situation, the en-route punctuality was collected during two month 
in the autumn 2011. Also the effect from other traffic was registered to see how other train influence the two 
conflicting trains depending on the dispatcher’s decisions. However, we have excluded the two conflicting trains’ 
possible impact at other traffic as a consequence of the dispatcher’s decision.  
3.1. Conflict situation example one  
The first example comprises southbound long-distance train 537 and commuter train 1231 in Hässleholm 
(HM). Train 537 is going from Stockholm (CST) to Malmö (M), and in HM train 1231 is planned to depart only 
two minutes after train 537 has passed the station. This means that if train 537 has just a small delay, it will result 
in a conflict in HM. From the punctuality statistics it is clear that the train dispatchers often deviate from the 
current prioritisation rule and let train 537 be prioritised before train 1231. This happens in situations when train 
537 is up to five minutes delayed. When train 537 is more than five minutes delayed, the punctuality statistics 
show that the dispatchers’ decisions vary from day to day, see Fig. 2. In the figure we can identify three distinct 
performance clusters occurring after HM. Depending on which cluster a train end up in, the final arrival delay in 
M differ. Trains in cluster 1 overtake train 1231 in LU, trains in cluster 2 overtake train 1231 in E and trains in 
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cluster 3 overtake 1231 already in TÖ or SG. The resulting average delay when arriving to M for each cluster is 
19 minutes for cluster 1, 16 minutes for cluster 2 and 12 minutes for cluster 3. In all situations train 1231 arrive at 
M with an average delay of two minutes.  
There are several trains that are in TÖ at the same time but then they are divided into different clusters 
depending on the dispatcher’s decision.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Punctuality statistics reflecting the train dispatchers decisions in the 
critical point in MY for train 542. The x-axis gives the space defined by 
stations and the y-axis gives the delay in minutes. The black lines 
represent three trains, equally delayed in MY, but given different priority. 
Trains with a delay less than 5 minutes are excluded. 
3.2. Conflict situation example two  
In the second example the train dispatcher’s decision and the resulting delay is even more distinct. The 
example concerns northbound long-distance train 542 and commuter train 8774 in Mjölby (MY), where train 
8774 is planned to depart four minutes after train 542 has passed the station. This means that if train 542 has just 
a small delay, it will result in a conflict at MY. In Fig. 3 the punctuality statistics for train 542 is shown. For three 
trains with the equal delay of 7 minutes in MY, the arrival delay at the end station (CST) varies relatively much 
depending on the dispatcher’s decision. In cluster 1, train 542 runs after train 8774 all the way to NR, which is 
the end station for the commuter train. This result in a 17 minutes delay for train 542 in NR, and for trains 542 
that are around 17 minutes late in NR, the average arrival delay in CST is 21 minutes. In cluster 2, train 542 
overtake train 8774 in LP but still gets 10 minutes delayed in NR. For trains 542 that are 10 minutes delayed in 
NR, the average arrival delay in CST is 11 minutes. In cluster 3, train 542 overtake train 8774 already in MT and 
remains 7 minutes delayed in NR. For trains 542 that are 7 minutes delayed in NR, the average arrival delay in 
CST is 8 minutes. However, the train in cluster 3 has the possibility to recover from the entire delay in time for 
CST, in contrast to trains in the other clusters, if all other trains are on time and nothing else unexpected happens. 
The trains in cluster 1 and 2 are delayed to such extent that they continue to CST in the wrong train slot and can 
not use their margins for recovering.  
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In cluster 1 and 2 the train dispatcher’s decision results in no delay for train 8774, but in cluster 3 train 8774 
will leave MY 3 minutes late. In LP this delays is reduced to one minute and soon after LP the commuter train 
has fully recovered from it. 
 

Fig. 3. Punctuality statistics reflecting the train dispatchers decisions in the critical point in 
MY for train 542. The x-axis gives the space defined by stations and the y-axis gives the 
delay in minutes. The black lines represent three trains, equally delayed in MY, but given 
different priority. Trains with a delay less than 5 minutes are excluded. 
4. Economic delay calculations for the examples 
Most people see traveling as an inevitable activity. Travelling in itself results in no utility, it is related to costs 
such as ticket purchase, fuel consumption, etc. Since a trip consume time that could be devoted to other more 
preferable activities it also has a time cost, which else could have been used for other, more valuable activities. 
To quantify this in monetary terms, the value of time (VOT) is used.  
A delayed trip has negative effects for the passengers, which also are associated with costs. A parameter 
frequently used for estimating the value of the uncertainty in travel time is the value of reliability (VOR). VOR is 
a parameter that describes how much money a person would pay to reduce the travel time uncertainty.  
When calculating the delay cost, VOR is the main parameter. VOR is based on VOT and therefore we start the 
calculations by presenting a short overview of the two parameters together with the Swedish values used today.  
4.1. The value of time 
Already in the middle of the 20th century researchers started to analyse VOT (e.g. Becker, 1965; De Serpa, 
1971). Some of these theories were followed up by empirical studies which can be seen in a review by Hensher 
(1976). In 1980, the British Department of Transportation decided to review the state of the art and find 
quantitative measures of VOT, which lead to the first national VOT study (MVA Consultancy, 1987). This study 
is now the source to several other national VOT studies, including the Swedish ones. 
When estimating VOT a fundamental assumption is that individuals want to maximise their utility. The most 
influencing factors for VOT are travel mode, travel distance, income and journey purpose (Mackie et al., 2003; 
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Small and Verhoef, 2007). The impact of these factors has been confirmed by many studies and the research of 
estimating VOT has been developed through the years. 
When estimating VOT for business travels there is one special aspect to consider, the travel time has also a 
value for the employer. One approach to estimate VOT for business travels is to set VOT to the marginal cost of 
the employer (Fowkes, Marks and Nash, 1986). The authors also argue about some factors that indicate that this 
is not an accurate estimation of VOT, e.g. the business trip might occur on private time and the employee might 
work during the travel. 
4.2. The value of reliability 
When there is an uncertainty in travel time the traveller has to add a “safety margin” to the travel time which 
has a cost assigned to it (Gaver, 1968). There is also a discomfort related to the uncertainty itself, i.e. the risk of 
being late. Jackson and Jucker (1982) introduced the concept of utility as a function of expected (mean) travel 
time and variability (standard deviation) in travel time and where travellers seek the best trade-off between them.  
Bates et al. (2001) bring together a large amount of theoretical and empirical results to find a general theory 
for travellers’ VOR. They study public transport especially where the timetables often are fixed. This means that 
the possibilities for departure are discrete which could lead to further disutility when travellers want to add a 
“safety margin” to the travel time. If the travel time becomes unreliable the generalised cost of using the service 
increases and the traveller might change to other transport modes. For scheduled travels with long intervals 
between departures and relatively low travel time variability, such as long-distance trains, the most common 
approach is to use average delay as a variability measure (Börjesson and Eliasson, 2012).  
4.3. Values used by Trafikverket 
The first national Swedish VOT study was performed by Algers, Dillén and Widlert (1995). One of the aims 
of this study was to co-ordinate resources from different transport sectors and estimate general VOT:s. Another 
aim was to provide more insight in VOT for business trips, since previous single Swedish studies had no 
satisfying general values. Algers, Dillén and Widlert (1995) used the Hensher-approach as a base for the business 
travel VOT and the following components to define VOT for business travels: 
 
• The marginal productivity of labour  
• The share of saved travel time used for leisure 
• The share of saved travel time used productively 
• The relative productivity of saved travel time that was used for work 
• The value to the employee of saved travel time despite work or leisure (VOT for private traveling) 
 
The values for public transport by rail was classified according to trip purpose (commuting, business or 
private), trip length (regional or national) and train type (regional, Inter-City or fast train). The values from the 
study fit well to other national VOT studies in Western Europe at that time (Balcombe et al., 2004). Since 1995, 
these values have been revised several times to represent the present year. 
In 2007/2008 a new VOT study was performed, leading to new national VOT:s. As before, the estimation was 
based on the travellers’ wish to maximise their utility. However, a new method for VOT estimation was chosen 
(Börjesson and Eliasson, 2012). The present VOT:s used for Swedish train cost-benefit analyses are shown in 
Table 1. 
VOT in the 2007/2008 study is not classified with respect to train type (Trafikverket, 2012) but it is estimated 
with respect to the length of the calculation period. If the calculation period is 40 years or more, the long-run 
values should be used, else the short-run values should be used. The long-time values are scaled up short-run 
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values due to expected income increase over the years, which will also result in increased VOT. 
There was also a new assumption made regarding VOT for railway business travels, namely that the share of 
saved travel time used for leisure should be zero (Trafikverket, 2012). This means that all travel time will accrue 
the employer. The relative productivity was set to 1, which means that the productivity is the same when 
travelling as working in the office. However, the share of saved travel time used productively, i.e. the time 
actually used for work, was set to only 15 %.  
Table 1. The present Swedish national VOT:s for public transport by rail. The values are presented in 
SEK/hour and expressed in 2010 price levels given estimates from the study performed in 2007/2008. (1 
SEK § 0.12 EUR, March 2013) (Trafikverket, 2012) 
  Private  Business 
  
Commuting   
(< 50 km) 
Regional     
(< 50 km) 
National    
(> 50 km) 
 Regional      
(< 50 km) 
National     
(> 50 km) 
Short-run 69 53 73  247 247 
Long-run 92 71 98  331 331 
 
The VOR estimation for public transport was based on average delay. This is an established way to estimate 
travel time uncertainties and just as theoretic well-motivated as variance or standard-deviation methods 
(Börjesson and Eliasson, 2011). The chosen VOR is 3.5 times VOT, which is in line with estimations by other 
studies (Trafikverket, 2012).  
4.4. Delay cost calculation formula and parameter values 
When calculating the delay cost for the different dispatcher decisions we only consider the costs for the two 
trains involved in the conflict. The delay cost for each train is calculated individually to be compared in the next 
step. To calculate the delay costs for train t we use the following formula: 




where Ƚ specifies the passenger type (commuter, private or business), ݀௧ is the delay for train t in hours, ݌௧ is 
the number of passengers on-board train t, ݏఈ௧ is the share of passenger type Ƚ at train t in percent and ஑ is 
the value of reliability for passenger type Ƚ in SEK/hour (஑ ൌ ͵Ǥͷ כ ஑ሻ. 
For long-distance trains an average number of passengers on-board between every station for the studied time 
period was provided by the operator, along with the share of passenger types, see Table 2. 
For the commuter trains, no precise information could be given. Therefore the occupancy on-board and share 
of passengers are based on assumptions. In a minor sensitivity analysis we have made small adjustment of the 
assumed figures and found that they have a small impact on the result. 
Table 2. The share of business, private and commuter 
passengers on the trains 
Train Business Private Commuter 
537 35 % 55 % 10 % 
542 34 % 57 % 9 % 
1231/8774 - 30 % 70 % 
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Both examples involve commuter trains that begin their journey around 6 p.m., which is in the afternoon 
traffic peak. In both commuter train systems they use the same type of train model, i.e. X61 with 210 seats, and 
the assumption made is that 90 per cent of the seats are occupied. This means that there are an average of 
approximately 190 passengers on-board commuter train 1231 and 8774.   
For the calculation we also need the share of each passenger type. In the examples the commuter trains operate 
in the afternoon peak we therefore assume that the share of commuters is high, 70%. The rest are travelling 
privately. The share of passengers for all involved trains is shown in Table 2.   
4.5. Result of the delay cost calculation  
The costs for the delays are calculated for the two examples and the result for the long-distance trains is shown 
in Table 3. We present the delay costs using the short-run VOT from Trafikverket (2012). The long-run values 
result in the same result but with figures scaled up.  
Table 3. Delay costs per long-distance train for the typical delays in the two examples 
 Delay (min) Cost (SEK) 
   (Short-run) 
Example 1 
Cluster 1 19 27 803 
Cluster 2 16 23 413 
Cluster 3 12 17 560 
Example 2 
Cluster 1 21 36 182 
Cluster 2 11 19 517 
Cluster 3 8 14 194 
 
In the table we can clearly see a difference in costs depending on how the train dispatcher has prioritised. For 
those trains, in example 1, that have the same delay in TÖ there is a possibility to save 4 400 – 5 900 SEK per 
train. This can be achieved by giving the long-distance train a higher priority and let it end up in a cluster with 
smaller secondary delays.  
For trains in example 2 the dispatcher’s influence on the delay cost has a larger impact. If the dispatcher would 
have let the train from cluster 1 run like the train in cluster 2, 16 700 SEK would be saved and if the dispatcher 
would have let it run like the train in cluster 3, 22 000 SEK would be saved. However, according to the current 
prioritisation rule the train dispatcher made the right decision for the train in cluster 1. The train was delayed and 
should not be prioritised before a train on time.  
To determine whether this is the best overall solution or not, the cost resulting from the commuter train delays 
must also be calculated. In example 1 the commuter train was two minutes delayed when arriving to M regardless 
of the train dispatchers’ prioritisation. This results in a delay cost of 1 400 SEK, which is much less than the cost 
for delaying the long-distance train. In fact, the commuter train could be delayed even more to let the long-
distance train have priority.  Since a train, according to Trafikverket, is delayed when it is more than 3 minutes 
behind its timetable, the small delay brought on the commuter train is not even considered as a delay.  
In example 2 the commuter train gets delayed in cluster 3. The three minutes departure delay in MY is soon 
absorbed and the cost for the small delay is 700 SEK. Compared to the savings of 22 000 SEK that can be made 
for the long-distance train, delaying the commuter train one minute must be seen as an acceptable loss. In this 
case the commuter train delay must be reported as a delay to Trafikverket, since it is three minutes, but no further 
reprimands or compulsions are needed. 
Reliability is an important factor that also has an effect on the travellers choice of transportation mode. In the 
above examples the delays could be reduced if the dispatchers deviate from the current prioritisation rule. In such 
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case also the reliability will increase. This would probably lead to a higher share of travellers choosing railway as 
transportation mode. The benefit for these new travellers is not included in the calculation, which means that the 
result is to some extent underestimated. 
5. Conclusions and future research 
In this paper the current prioritisation rule for trains in conflict has been studied. The current rule is easily 
communicated and implemented and implies that an on-time train should always be prioritised before a delayed 
train. However, for a frequently occurring conflict situation, we show that this rule leads to a poor economic 
efficiency that brings large costs that could have been avoided with another strategy. We also show that it is 
possible to reduce costs by delaying the on-time train and by such means prevent the already delayed train to get 
even more delayed. Often the train dispatchers make good decisions that result in overall reduced delays, but 
there is a need for decision support that encourages them. The main contribution of this paper is to show that cost 
reductions can be made with another prioritisation strategy.  
How to establish new prioritisation rules is a challenge for future research. Intuitively, a more natural rule for 
prioritising between trains in conflict should be to let the train with the largest cost be prioritised. This requires a 
more extensive analysis of all cost involved in a certain decision.  
When delaying an on-time train it could result in more negative effects such as important transfers could be 
missed or rolling-stock circulations could break. In real traffic, there is more traffic and a delayed train can end 
up after several other trains, far from its own timetable slot, and with no possibility to recover. Therefore it is 
important to make the prioritisation from a broader perspective than to just give priority to the on-time train. To 
get the best overall solution it is necessary to include more trains in a comprehensive analysis since a decision at 
one point in the network could result in more or less successful chain reactions further on. This paper serves as an 
incitement to proceed with further more thorough studies.  
When dealing with larger networks there is a need for other methods, such as optimisation and simulation. The 
induced economic costs, as presented in this paper, could be a suitable objective for such an optimisation 
procedure.  
For an acceptance among the operators, however, the strategy should be combined with some type of 
economic compensation controlling equity between the operators and Trafikverket. In such way we would 
achieve a higher reliability, which would also lead to increased railway travelling.  
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